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Sandpointe Apts. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 129 Nev. Adv. Op. 87 (Nov. 14, 2013)1 
 




 The Court determined two issues: (1) whether NRS 40.459(1)(c) is a new statute that 
impacts vested rights; and (2) whether, pursuant to the language in Assembly Bill 273 (“A.B. 




 NRS 40.459(1)(c) is a new statute that impacts vested rights; therefore, it may not apply 
retroactively unless such intent was clearly manifested by the Legislature.  Language in A.B. 273 
indicates the statute may not apply retroactively, and there is no clear or strong evidence 
supporting application of the statute retroactively. Thus, NRS 40.459(1)(c) only applies 
prospectively to loans entered into after June 10, 2011. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 In 2007, Silver State Bank issued a loan to Sandpointe Apartments, for the construction 
of an apartment complex.  Silver State Bank held the Note and Deed of Trust, which contained a 
power of sale provision.  In 2008, the Nevada Financial Institutions Division closed Silver State 
Bank and appointed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as the loan’s receiver.  In 
2009, Sandpointe defaulted on the loan.  The FDIC then sold the loan and the guarantee to 
Multibank in 2010.  Multibank transferred its interest in the loan and the guarantee to its wholly 
owned subsidiary, CML-NV Sandpointe, a single purpose entity created by Multibank to 
facilitate and pursue collections on the loan.  CML-NV held a trustee’s sale under the deed of 
trust’s power of sale provision, at which CML-NV purchased the property securing the loan for a 
credit bid of $1,440,000.  CML-NV subsequently sued Sandpointe for deficiency and breach of 
guaranty. 
In 2011, the Nevada Legislature passed A.B. 273, which limits the amount of a 
deficiency judgment that a successor in interest can recover.  The district court held that A.B. 
273 only applies to loans entered into after June 10, 2011, and accordingly granted CML-NV’s 
request for summary judgment.  Sandpointe appealed, arguing that applying AB 273 in this 
instance would not constitute retroactive operation of the statute, and that even if it would, A.B. 




Policy underlying A.B. 273 and NRS 40.459(1)(c) 
 
Nevada’s real estate market experienced a downturn with the recent recession, leading to 
a large secondary market in which various entities, including collection companies, would 
purchase distressed loans at great discounts.  The entities would later foreclose on the collateral 
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and pursue deficiency judgments against the debtors and guarantors based upon the full 
indebtedness.2  This activity led to A.B. 273, which became law following the 2011 legislative 
session and is codified, in pertinent part, in NRS 40.459.  The statute provides that “[i]f a person 
seeking the judgment acquired the right to obtain the judgment from a person who previously 
held that right,” then the person seeking the judgment may only recover  
 
the amount by which the amount of the consideration paid for that 
right exceeds the fair market value of the property sold at the time 
of sale or the amount for which the property was actually sold, 
whichever is greater, with interest from the date of sale and 
reasonable costs[.]3 
 
The intent of A.B. 273 was to prevent a creditor from profiting from a judgment in excess 
of the amount the creditor originally paid for the right to pursue such a judgment.4 This would 
discourage creditors from purchasing notes or mortgages at deep discounts and encourage 
creditors to negotiate with borrowers directly.. 
 
NRS 40.459(1)(c)’s retroactive effect 
 
 Unless it is clear that the drafters intended for a statute to apply retroactively, courts will 
presume substantive statutes only apply prospectively.5  This presumption comes from a policy 
of fairness, as “individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform 
their conduct accordingly; settled expectations should not be lightly disrupted.”6  Additionally, 
the law fosters creativity in endeavors when people are confident about the legal consequences of 
their actions.7   
 In analyzing whether applying a new statute would constitute retroactive operation, 
courts consider “fundamental notions of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled 
expectations.”8  A statute acts retroactively when it “takes away or impairs vested rights acquired 
under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new 
disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past.”9 
 
NRS 40.459(1)(c) attaches a new disability and would impair vested rights if applied to 
deficiencies arising after trustee sales that took place before the statute became effective 
 
 NRS 40.451(1)(c) does not merely clarify existing law, but it attaches a new disability. 
NRS 40.459(1)(c) limits the amount of the judgment that a successor in interest may recover in a 
deficiency judgment action to the amount the successor paid to acquire the interest in the 
                                                
2 See Hearing on A.B. 273 Before the Assembly Commerce and Labor Comm., 76th Leg. (Nev., March 23, 2011). 
3 NEV. REV. STAT. § 40.459(1)(c) (2013). 
4 Hearing on A.B. 273 Before the Assembly Commerce and Labor Comm., 76th Leg. (Nev., March 23, 2011). 
5 Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 273 (1994). 
6 Id. at 265.  
7 Id. at 265–66. 
8 Pub. Emps.’ Benefits Program v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t (PERP), 124 Nev. 138, 155, 179 P.3d 542, 553 
(2008) (internal quotations omitted). 
9 Id., at 155, 179 P.3d at 553–54 (citing INS v. St. Cyr. 533 U.S. 289, 321). 
obligation. In contrast, NRS 40.451 limits only the lien amount to the amount of consideration 
paid.  
 Further, the Court notes that “even if NRS 40.459(1)(c) had not changed the law as to 
deficiency judgment against borrowers, it clearly changed the law as to judgments against 
guarantors following a sale, pursuant to a judicial foreclosure or a trustee’s sale.” Pre-2011 
guarantors of a note received no protection with any consideration-amount limit in the factors 
used to determine indebtedness.  NRS 40.459(1)(c) created a new limitation on the amount 
recoverable against guarantors. Thus, when a guarantor sells its right to obtain a judgment, and 
the successor decides to judicially foreclose or conduct a trustee’s sale, the guarantor is given the 
same protections as borrowers. Therefore, “NRS 40.459(1)(c) is not simply a clarification of 
existing law, but is rather a new limitation on the amount that may be recovered in a deficiency 
judgment.”  
 
The right to a deficiency judgment is a vested right 
 
 The right to deficiency vests upon sale of the secured property.  The trustee’s sale date is 
used to determine both the fair market value and the trustee’s sale price of the property securing 
the loan, which determines the deficiency amount.10  Additionally, the right to receive proceeds 
from a foreclosure sale vests at the time of the foreclosure sale, and so it follows that the right to 
a judgment for the amount not received in a foreclosure sale vests on the trustee’s sale date.11  
The trustee’s sale commences the six-month limitations period for pursuing a deficiency 
judgment.12 Thus, “applying NRS 40.459(1)(c) to deficiencies arising from sales that took place 
before that provision was enacted would affect vested rights.” 
 
Application of NRS 40.459(1)(c) in this case would have a retroactive effect 
 
 The Court relied on Holloway v. Barrett, a similar case in which a statute limited the 
amount of a deficiency judgment to the difference between the total amount owed on the loan 
and the fair market value of the property securing the loan.13  In that case, the Court specifically 
did not consider applying the limitation to loans executed prior to the effective date of the statute 
even if the foreclosure sales occurred after the statute’s effective date.14  Based on that case, the 
Court concluded that statutes affecting deficiency judgments operate prospectively when the 
trustee’s sale occurs after enactment, and retroactively when the trustee’s sale occurs before 
enactment. Therefore, applying NRS 40.459(1)(c) here, where the trustee’s sale occurred before 
the statute’s enactment would require the Court to apply the statute retroactively.  
 
NRS 40.459(1)(c) may only apply prospectively 
 
 The presumption against retroactive legislation is strong and the Nevada Supreme Court 
has historically disapproved of retroactive statutes, labeling them “odious and tyrannical.”15  
                                                
10 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 40.459(1) (2013). 
11 NEV. REV. STAT. § 40.462(1) (2013). 
12 NEV. REV. STAT. § 40.455(1) (2013). 
13 Holloway v. Barrett, 87 Nev. 385, 387 n.1, 487 P.2d 501, 502 (1971). 
14 Id.  at 386-88, 487 P.2d at 502-03. 
15 Milliken v. Sloat, 1 Nev. 573, 577 (1865). 
Thus, unless the Legislature clearly manifests an intent to apply a statue retroactively, a statute 
will only apply prospectively. 
 
The Legislature did not clearly manifest an intent to apply NRS 40.459(1)(c) retroactively 
 
 The Legislature did not expressly indicate that NRS 40.459(1)(c) should operate 
retroactively, only providing that it “become[s] effective upon passage and approval.”16  This 
language falls well short of the express indication required. Additionally, the language was not 
ambiguous, making it unnecessary to seek out other legislative materials to determine intent.  
Even if the statute’s effective date language were ambiguous, the Legislature would still not have 
clearly manifested an intent to apply the statute retroactively. 
  
Nothing in NRS 40.459(1)(c) clearly, strongly, and imperatively shows that the Legislature’s 
intent can only be implemented by applying the statute retroactively 
 
Although NRS 40.459(1)(c) would have a broader impact if courts applied it 
retroactively, that fact alone is not enough to rebut the presumption against retroactivity.17  
Applying the statute prospectively still enables it to reach a large portion of the secondary market 
for distressed loans.  Additionally, legislative comments made during the committee hearings for 
A.B. 273 indicate that the Legislature did not intend the provisions to apply retroactively.18  




 NRS 40.459(1)(c) cannot apply retroactively because it is a new statute that impacts 
vested rights, and intent for the statute to apply retroactively was not clearly manifested by the 
Legislature. There was also no clear or strong evidence supporting applying the statute 
retroactively.  Therefore, because the trustee’s sale occurred before the statute’s effective date, 
NRS 40.459(1)(c)’s limitations cannot apply here.  The Court denied Sandpointe’s petition for 
extraordinary relief.   
 
 
                                                
16 2011 Nev. Stat., ch. 311, § 7, at 1748.  
17 See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 285–286. 
18 See Hearing on A.B. 273 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 76th Leg. 2-3 (Nev., May 3, 2011); Hearing on A.B. 
273 Before the Assembly Commerce and Labor Comm., 76th Leg. 12-13 (Nev., March 28, 2011); Hearing on A.B. 
273 Before the Assembly Commerce and Labor Comm., 76th Leg., at 7 (Nev., March 23, 2011).  
